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Expectations and Assertions
Perspectives for Growth and 
Adaptation in Buddhism
Luis O. Gomez
Introductory Note: A Personal Viewpoint
We have been asked to address the difficult question of the significance of 
Buddhism—especially Zen—in the modern age. Sometimes this question is 
expressed with high-sounding phrases such as “What can Buddhism do for 
mankind?” or “What is it that Buddhism has to offer humanity?” What­
ever the apparent purport of the question, the answer will have apologetic 
implications. In other words, one can hardly speak about “significance” or 
“meaning” in this sense of the words without evaluating, recommending or 
choosing certain ideas to the exclusion of others. The moment we set for 
ourselves the task of evaluating or predicting the role of Buddhism in the 
modern world, we have accepted, without further questioning, several 
assumptions that may or may not be at all consonant with the ideals of 
Buddhism as we ourselves propound them. One can easily undertake the 
difficult project of apologetics or proselytism without asking first what is 
the final object of the enterprise. To do so is to risk undermining, perhaps 
not the success, but most definitely the honesty of the undertaking.
I am speaking of underlying objectives, not the avowed goals of the 
spiritual path. Ultimately the way we understand or judge the significance 
of religious philosophy and interreligious dialogue will depend mainly on
* This paper was presented at the International Symposium for Religious Philosophy 
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what we, as private individuals, expect of our own intentions and how we 
judge the intentions of others. This is not meant as a denial of the pur­
ported goal or function of religion as a spiritual discipline. In a certain 
sense personal objectives and the goals of the spiritual path may overlap. 
That is to say, a certain religious practice may, so to speak, retrace in 
inverse order the steps of the purely personal or self-centered life. But it 
is also true that the ego may direct religious values and symbols to less 
noble causes.
The subtle correlation of these forces in the mind is better left to those 
who are knowledgeable in the field of psychology. The ethical issues, less 
amenable to the methods of the social sciences, deserve a more detailed and 
formal discussion in a different forum. For the present symposium I have 
limited myself to a cursory, and personal examination of the way in which 
historical and cultural variation affects this subtle interaction. I say a 
“personal” examination, because in matters of intentions and expectations 
I’d rather not judge the feelings and attitudes of others, yet I must assume 
that theirs are somehow similar to mine. Given this frame of reference, the 
pages that follow should be understood as a description of a personal, 
unfinished journey. This point of view has the weaknesses of subjectivity, 
but the strength of familiarity.
Using this vantage point, I would like to propose that my statements on 
any matter, however removed they might seem from my personal life, 
reflect self-centered motivations of different kinds. This paper is itself a 
mirror of my expectations. My ideas and words are informed or con­
structed by personal hopes and desires. Furthermore, I would like to sub­
mit to you that this inordinate domination of my view of things by the self 
is even stronger and more preponderant in areas of explicit social sig­
nificance, such as religion. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the fact 
that, paradoxically, some religions, such as Buddhism, aim at attacking 
precisely the subjective domination that I have just said characterizes my 
view of the world.
Turning to the matter at hand, the above statements imply that when I 
speak about Buddhism or Zen my first tendency is to use this activity as a 
means of bolstering or enhancing a certain self-image that often will have a 
life of its own, independent from the “universal” or “objective” import of 
my statements. It does not matter whether I declare myself a Buddhist or 
not, my ego is at stake. Of course, if I do declare myself a believer or 
practitioner, the stakes are much higher. Furthermore, it seems, the act of
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saying something about Buddhism becomes not only an exteriorization of 
the ego, it is also a further construction of ego. In other words, the abstract 
formulations I utter become an extension of ego, and as such, may well 
become more significant as protective layers of selfhood, than as accurate 
descriptions of any external reality. In fact, this may explain why we need 
to construct an object called “Buddhism,” an “ism” to buttress and label 
ourselves.
I have made you suffer this long preamble to make the point that our 
first step when we talk about what Buddhism “is” or “will be” should be to 
analyze carefully what we are saying, what we mean, and what we are 
doing to Buddhism by talking about it. Whether our statements describe 
what Buddhism A or only serve to shape Buddhism in our own image 
depends on a delicate balance between the desire to make Buddhism intel­
ligible in our own terms, and our capacity to transcend the limitations of 
our intentionality. What we expect from Buddhism is ultimately what we 
want for ourselves. Therefore, what we say and do about Buddhism may 
well be just what we want things to be and not what Buddhism has to tell 
us.
In this connection, one must introduce yet another distinction, for the 
activities of talking and doing can be carried out with or without a claim to 
“belonging” to the tradition. This claim introduces a further sociological 
complication in the question of intentions or hidden expectations. Pre­
sumably the outsider is merely an observer, whereas the insider has both a 
commitment and a privileged point of view. However, as suggested 
previously, I question the purity of the believer’s commitment (including 
my own, of course), as well as the advantage of his “privileged” access to 
the tradition. Moreover, I also question the unassailable integrity of the 
“objective” observer, for he, like the believer, has a “person” behind his 
“personal viewpoint,” an ego that can be threatened or bolstered in some 
way by his “findings” about Buddhism. This is not to deny that the be­
liever is usually more vulnerable, for he has much more to lose (or so he 
thinks) if he is found to be in error. Be that as it may, however, I am more 
concerned about the possible weaknesses in the believer’s position in itself, 
and not in contrast to that of the non-believer. As an avowed Buddhist I 
am particularly concerned about my own honesty with myself. Accordingly, 
I do want to question the special access of the believer, by asking the ques­
tions, access to what and to what purpose? A hidden transmission, a 
whispered secret? Or is it not that the believer, by the mere fact of his de-
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dared belief becomes the spokesman, and thereby the creator of tradition?
If there were the infallible access to the tradition of the believer that some 
claim, one would expect a unity in the religious tradition that simply is not 
there. The truth of the matter is that, strictly speaking, there are no true 
insiders any more than true detached observers. Both—the one claiming to 
be a neutral researcher, and the one who would consider himself a spokes­
man for the tradition—are under similar, historical and personal limita­
tions. Therefore, either way one is under the obligation of checking (that 
is, inspecting and correcting) the shortcomings of one’s positions. I would 
like to suggest that this can be done by responding honestly to three 
questions:
1. What do I mean when I say “Buddhism”?
2. What do I, as an egocentric individual, stand to lose or gain from 
what I may learn or say about Buddhism?
3. What do I expect, in a more general way, from my talking about 
or doing Buddhism?
4. What can I do to seek an answer to questions 1, 2 and 3?
I will not pretend that I can answer these question for anyone else but 
myself, and I will not attempt to answer them well in the space I have at my 
disposal. I will only respond briefly to the problems raised by these ques­
tions, in the hope that this will stimulate discussion among those con­
cerned with the theme of this symposium.
Uses of the Term “Buddhism”
Provisional Definition
Most believers in a given religious tradition speak of the formulations of 
their beliefs in terms that would suggest that their doctrines are unchang­
ing reflections of eternal truth. Naturally, one should not expect less from 
someone who has made a choice and a life commitment. However, this 
approach to established belief is not without disadvantages for the person 
who is thus engaged in the pursuit of a particular form of the religious life. 
For once such an attitude is assumed the tradition no longer speaks to the 
believer and his circumstances. Furthermore, paradoxically, by clinging to 
what appears as a literal obedience to the past, one has closed the doors to 
the past, both as a dynamic complex of changing views and practices, and 
as a grammar of symbols that derived its meaning from a context.
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Faithfulness to tradition should be faithfulness to its complexities and 
contradictions, a quest for the circumstances in which it has been sig­
nificant, and openness before to the voices that contradict our preferred 
interpretations. If we are to follow the method that is suggested by the self- 
criticism outlined above, then we must begin by defining Buddhism in 
terms that are concrete enough to serve as a point of contrast or touchstone 
for our own expectations or fancies about “Buddhism.” In other words, we 
cannot at the outset begin by speaking in general terms about what Bud­
dhism is truly or “essentially” saying. We must first enter a dialogue with 
the tradition, an exchange that may well contradict all our assumptions 
and thwart all our expectations. This Buddhism has to be defined in non- 
normative terms. That is, our starting point will be the common use of the 
term “Buddhism” to refer to the aggregate of ideas, practices and attitudes 
held as the norm by those who in the past and the present have claimed to 
be heirs to the teaching of Sakyamuni Buddha—in the broadest sense and 
including those who would see Sakyamuni as being somehow superseded by 
other elements in the tradition (as in Tantra, and in a certain manner of 
speaking, in Pure Land Buddhism), and those who could be considered 
naive or simple-minded by scholars and stuffy clerics.
The implications of such a definition are obvious: Buddhism, as a 
partner in dialogue, is not the friend that echoes my thoughts, but a number 
of voices, sometimes contradictory among themselves, often contrary to 
my expectations. These voices force on me an examination of my expecta­
tions and intentions: “What do I, as an egocentric individual, stand to lose 
or gain from what I may learn or say about Buddhism? Are my intentions 
in this regard consonant with the message of Buddhism?”
Self-Interest and “Buddhism"
It is evident to me that, having declared myself “a Buddhist,” I stand to 
lose face, credibility, and acceptance in a society that is primarily non­
Buddhist, if not outright hostile to Buddhism. On the other hand, there is 
also the possibility of “success,” that is to say, persuading others that 
unusual—not to say “exotic”—ideas and practices can be meaningful. 
Still, with acceptance one discovers a paradox, an inner tension in the 
fabric of one’s aspirations; for the crude manifestation of ego becomes 
stronger as success in understanding and explaining Buddhism increases. 
Yet by being the antithesis of what Buddhism stands for, this expression of 
the ego tends to undermine the value of any success in understanding and
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explanation. This point might seem like a simple confession of human 
weakness (which it is), but it also is presented here because it is pertinent 
to the problem of making Buddhism meaningful in the modern age. For, 
the internal reality of the power of ego requires that we act with extreme 
caution. In our struggle to find purpose, meaning and relevance, the 
highest goals can be perverted by this power. Achieving our most dear 
aspirations is not necessarily the same thing as giving meaning to our life. 
Meaning and import are not measured by success, nor sought for that 
purpose; rather, it is ultimately nothing but the significance of facing the 
challenge of a tradition that seeks to challenge, rather than to confirm our 
fancies about ourselves. To answer to the call for dialogue with the tradi­
tion is to enter that place where the self faces the self in total loneliness. To 
paraphrase a Zen aphorism: within oneself one is alone, yet as in a crowd, 
checked by many eyes and voices, but among those voices one is as if alone, 
never protected by others. All speculation about the “meaning of Bud­
dhism” must be subject to this acid test.
Accordingly, we must ask, “Is there a Buddhism outside my own ideas 
of Buddhism?” We have to admit that there is, unless we are willing to 
assume a solipsistic hermeneutics—not at all a rare phenomenon, but for 
that reason no less absurd. I do not mean to suggest that there is only a 
subjective Buddhism, nor do I intend to deny the existence of an extra- 
subjective force or complex of forces, to which I must refer with the word 
“Buddhism,” for lack of a better word. The existence of “an objective Bud­
dhism,” however amorphous it might be, is one factor in making possible 
the dialogue between my subjective intentions and Buddhism. The possi­
bility of such an exchange is a necessary condition for this symposium, and 
for any “talk about Buddhism.”
Of course, whatever the nature of the external force, I must first bring 
to the surface my own intentions in order to establish the dialectic that will 
generate meaning as transformation. As I review my sincerity in this way, 
I may rediscover in myself the sources of the Buddhist tradition, and there­
by change my intentions and goals. This rediscovery may appear to me as a 
revelation of “the nature of things,” not as a reality dictated by a doctrinal 
tradition. Still, dialogue with the Buddhism that exists outside my limited 
self is a necessary condition for calling my efforts “Buddhism.” Without 
this dialectic what we “did about” Buddhism could be a perversion of the 
tradition and of our own declared intentions.
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Expectations and Experiences
An Analogy. We are now ready to consider point three of our tripartite 
question: What do I expect from my talking about or doing Buddhism? 
The problem is more complex than it seems, for the point is that our ex­
pectations color our perception of Buddhism. It should be evident, from my 
discussion of point two, that eventually one must face and combat the 
hidden motivations of one’s “spiritual quest.” One way of doing so is by 
considering the nature of the complex expectations that accompany the 
spiritual path, as spiritual path. To approach this issue I will use an analogy 
which I believe illustrates well the complexities of investigating human 
motivation, and thereby may illuminate our search for new ways to under­
stand Buddhism. This usage of the term “understanding” assumes a prag­
matic definition. To understand here means to find ways of talking or 
acting that will make Buddhism “make sense” in our cultural and historical 
contexts.
If I could paraphrase a well-known Zen illustration, and twist a bit an 
old Pali parable without offending your sense of tradition, I would like to 
explore some parallels between the experience of savoring a cup of coffee 
or tea (green, black or herbal, if you will), and religious experience. The 
comparison is useful as long as we keep in mind that it is a partial analogy, 
and that one should not assume that religious experience is merely an aes­
thetic experience.
If one enjoys drinking coffee, wine or tea, there is no question that 
enjoyment follows from an experience of taste. In a certain sense, therefore, 
when I drink a cup of coffee, I do not have to investigate or label the nature 
and origin of the coffee, nor is it necessary to demand a justification for the 
activity of drinking my morning coffee. However, the metaphor is not as 
self-evident as it seems, for in real life we do increase our enjoyment of 
coffee or tea by enhancing sense pleasure with the aesthetics of cultured 
reflection. Furthermore, we can be lead to tasting a particular kind of 
coffee by certain verbal signs. Lastly, we do often have motivations that go 
“deeper” (in the sense of farther away from the surface) than our avowed 
reasons for drinking coffee. Tea is generally drunk to enjoy it, but the 
enjoyment may include knowledge about tea or coffee, as well as our own 
pride and delight in knowing about coffee, and our past experiences (in­
dividual and social) with this particular drink.
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Three Types of Religious Knowledge. This modified version of ancient 
wisdom, is presented here to show that the metaphor of “pure experience” 
already tells us that there is more to experience than a simple apprehension 
of an object. As in the drinking of good tea, wine or coffee, in religion too 
some forms of intellectual effort and conditioning accompany the experi­
ence and behavior of tasting. Furthermore, certain—at times aberrant or 
perverse—forms of self-seeking or ego-building may be more than acci­
dentally connected with the experience. The following discussion of the 
illustration should dispel any fears that this is proposed as an unconditional 
rejection of the concept of direct religious experience. Tasting is still tast­
ing. But one cannot be initiated into the art and pleasure of coffee or wine 
without certain preliminaries (and a person who is able to taste and does 
not want or is unable to share the joys of his experience is indeed an an­
tisocial gourmet). These preliminaries are usually of two kinds: a tradi­
tion of manners and a tradition of justification. That is, enjoyment of a 
drink or a dish occurs in a certain cultural context, which enhances or cre­
ates the meaning of the participant’s actions, feelings, and perceptions. 
But the latter aspect is not always invisible; it can also be expressed or 
explicit, for instance, if the custom is justified by a religious festival or a 
myth, or in the speculation of theologians. When the tradition is presented 
to an outside observer the explicit formulation of meaning becomes essen­
tial. It is sometimes not enough to say “taste!” or “drink!”—complex 
explanation or invitation is required.
Once the initial or habitual resistance to tasting has been overcome, and 
the wine has been enjoyed more than once, taste is developed and refined. 
New angles are explored—including new ways of attracting others to the 
enjoyment of that taste. Sometimes this last stage is so important that 
persons will spend a great deal of energy in reflecting ex post facto or 
even in purely abstract terms on the joys and advantages of tasting the 
savored meal or drink. Or someone may be primarily intent on “showing 
off,” or gaining adepts to his or her favorite tastes.
Now, on the last point the analogy breaks down, at least on a normative 
level; for the enjoyment of coffee can be replaced by the purely abstract 
consideration of the activity and its social or cultural margins. Moreover, 
the cultivation of “learning about coffee” for no other purpose than intel­
lectual greed is not always frowned upon. Religious behavior and experi­
ence, on the other hand, are understood, in the Buddhist tradition at least, 
as standing in a sphere of experience wholly different from intellectual ab­
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straction, a realm which should lie beyond any form of greed and pride. A 
contradiction is therefore perceived—especially in the Zen tradition— 
between enjoying the tea or coffee of Buddhism and craving for it or 
talking about it.
Still, the preliminary or initiatory stage and the subsequent intellectual 
appreciation and distillation remain as a common ground in both categories 
of “tasting,” aesthetic and religious. No matter how direct, practical and 
positive one’s approach to tasting might be, there is the initial invitation 
and the subsequent sharing of one’s insight into the activity with those who 
either cannot or will not make the required effort to reach the actual 
object.
Among its many scholastic categories, the Indian Buddhist tradition in­
cluded three types of religious cognition: preparatory, transcendent, and 
subsequent. The first and third have a definite intellectual or conceptual 
content. Only the second one is non-conceptual. It goes without saying that 
it is also the most important, the one without which the others would be 
pointless and meaningless. The other two are nevertheless indispensable. If 
I were to express this in non-traditional terms, I would formulate the follow­
ing interpretation: the unquestionable and ineffable source of meaning 
must be conceived of through the metaphor of “the non-dual experience of 
tasting.” The question of the meal’s significance cannot be legitimately 
raised while it is being tasted. Meaning arises from tasting. Still, it is only 
in conveying to others an invitation to the meal, in setting out towards the 
dining room, in sharing with others the meal, that the intent and import 
become problematic. Consequently, one must then raise the questions of 
expectation and motivation.
Questions of Meaning
Meaning and Explanation
There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between the experience of 
tasting and the activity of explanation or justification, however inter­
dependent they may be. Furthermore, one can hardly exaggerate the im­
portance of the latter function in the history of Buddhism, including Zen. 
“Buddhism” as an idea and as an institution is by definition an ideological 
system, rhetorical structure, a social reference point for other things. Our 
interaction with such structures may or may not (though it should) redirect 
us towards introspection, intimate awareness and self-transformation, but 
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the rhetorico-social aspect cannot be ignored, because all religious activities 
begin and end with this phase. We deceive ourselves if we preach and up­
hold “Buddhism,” while denying at the same time its content as an ideology 
and socio-political force. Communication with others is influencing others, 
developing effective rhetorical devices—we justify and explain coffee 
drinking in order to get others to agree with us, and if possible, join in our 
enjoyment of coffee. The common rejection of conceptual thought, the 
emphasis on a non-dual ineffable experience, which are so common among 
Buddhists, is often nothing more than a way of protecting ourselves from 
criticism—“the truth” as the last stronghold of the ego. Criticism by others 
serves as a constructive way of attacking our own self-image.
An exchange of criticisms is essential to any type of dialogue—dialogue 
across cultural barriers is no exception. One must pass through an initial 
stage of openness to a different grammar of symbols before undertaking 
a rebuttal or a concession. Similarly, adoption and modification re­
quire gradual assimilation and adaptation, if one seeks to maintain the 
continuity of the tradition. That is to say, if the goal is neither recalcitrant 
fundamentalism nor expedient accommodation, then the expression of 
tradition is a dialectic between traditional forms and the historical context 
in which it is expressed, including other symbolic or doctrinal orders.
Dogmatics and rhetoric are often assumed to be non-existent in Bud­
dhism. This is most unfortunate, because lack of awareness of what is 
actually there leads to superficial understanding and weak apologetics. The 
rhetoric of emptiness (and nothingness) is often taken too literally without 
an understanding of its functions as metaphor or metalinguistic device. The 
hackneyed appeal to “experience” and “practice” obscures the value of 
scrupulous and responsible practice. It numbs, moreover, one’s capacity 
to understand the intimate connection existing between self-cultivation and 
sharing. An unqualified appeal to simple practice conceals the fact that even 
“experience” and “practice” have dogmatic, rhetoric and social frames of 
reference.
Much could be gained by exploring in which way Buddhist practice and 
experience can be accurately described as ritual, and therefore as particular 
forms of symbolic expression. This is one area where we might have some­
thing to learn from the Indian approach to Buddhism, with its full aware­
ness of ritual, and the understanding that “the non-dual experience” is 
not the whole story, for the props are there and are not to be abandoned 
that easily.
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We cannot legitimately raise the question of the meaningfulness—or lack 
thereof—of a religious order except in those cases in which the experience 
becomes an idea, or a system; that is, when it is somehow asking to be 
received into another setting. There is, of course, a sociological dimension 
to this distinction, for the extent to which a set of beliefs, attitudes, or 
practices is meaningful is obviously dependent on the degree to which it has 
penetrated the unquestioned assumptions of a cultural order. In this sense, 
the apparently purely religious, and Buddhist, issue of communicating a 
so-called “mystical” experience to others takes on an urgent historical 
character. Once it becomes an unquestioned and integral part of a system, 
the set of beliefs will be challenged only when the cultural order changes or 
is forced to change.
The question of meaning arises when the message of the religion implies 
expectations which are different from those of the social context in which 
it is found, or from which it is observed. To speak in more concrete terms: 
Buddhism was certainly meaningful to millions of Asians for twenty-five 
hundred years, but it is no longer meaningful to many Asians, and certainly 
does not make much sense to most Westerners.
The problem then arises naturally, “Is Buddhism at all meaningful?” 
This question is deceptively simple and obvious. Precisely expressed, it 
should be reformulated to say, “Is Buddhism meaningful for group X or Y 
or Z?” The more general statement of the question is not wholly absurd, 
however, because Buddhism itself has already an implied claim to validity 
beyond a certain group, a claim which makes its meaning out to be some­
thing more than simply meeting the expectations of a particular group of 
people. Or, to turn once more to the concept of a critical encounter or 
dialogue, the issue is not simply whether Buddhism met the expectations of 
person X, or whether it will meet my expectations. The question is how is 
Buddhism to change one’s expectations.
In a certain sense, meaningfulness is a function of the (seemingly) un­
changing ideological structures of a religion and the cultural matrix within 
which it lives or dies. But, in another sense, meaningfulness is derived from 
the capacity to transform, in an interaction between religious ideology and 
action as a force external to a given social context, however brief these en­
counters may seem. The pressing issue for us in the West—and I suspect 
for many contemporary Japanese—is fundamentally “Why Buddhism?” 
Whether we accept this question as relevant or not, it certainly overshadows 
all our attempts to underline or highlight the particulars of history or the 
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non-dual, unquestionable experience.
There are, moreover, pressing social and historical forces that we cannot 
ignore by hiding in a cocoon of mystical platitudes. The institutions of 
Buddhism are not independent from or beyond the realities of the social 
and cultural context in which they occur, so that one would be naive to 
hope that Buddhism could remain immune to the changes that we are 
witnessing today. The Buddhist religion is perceived as irrelevant and mar­
ginal to the development of modern technology, that is, to the instruments 
of worldly success. This means that Buddhism is indeed under threat of 
extinction.
The second question is how to make Buddhism a factor of consequence 
under present cultural and economic circumstances. In other words, what 
is necessary to translate Buddhism from a religion of Asia, and a religion of 
the past, to a contemporary religion ? Much has happened in Buddhism, 
especially in countries like Japan, to bring it to date with the contemporary 
world. But the truth of the matter is that the more established sects—the 
ones with the greatest intellectual wealth—have remained comparatively 
static, so that the most aggressive and positive attempts at accommodation 
have been made by groups which in truth can hardly be considered repre­
sentatives of the highest ideals of the religion of Sakyamuni.
Meaning and Adaptation
This brings us to the last of the four questions or issues listed earlier, for the 
importance of the preparatory and resulting actions that accompany re­
ligious experience already points to the importance of method. This ques­
tion connects also with the problem of Buddhism in the contemporary 
world; for once we begin to investigate our common expectations, the 
hopes and needs that we share with others, we encounter the problem of 
our cultural and historical conditioning. At this point we have to ask about 
specific methods or strategies for establishing a fruitful dialogue between the 
tradition and ourselves.
In replying to the first of the four questions with a broad definition of 
Buddhism that recognizes inconsistency and change as an important ele­
ment in understanding a religious tradition, the believer’s relation to the 
tradition is also redefined. The purpose of trusting this tradition is to 
establish a transforming dialogue, a critique of the ego-centric individual 
that clings to one, unmoving faith (question 2). This level of exchange and 
adaptation (within the individual) leads now to a second level: acceptance 
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of change and adaptation as a necessary condition for the manifestation 
of meaning.
There is, furthermore, a close connection between adaptation and com­
munication. Our need to avoid deceiving ourselves does not require that 
we withdraw into ourselves. The self-critical process may contribute to 
one’s capacity to accept other challenges, which are primarily social or 
historical. In fact, these challenges must become part of our attack on the 
ego. There are, therefore, certain expectations that we may have about 
Buddhism which are necessary or legitimate in the sense that they are 
genuine responses or effective strategies in dealing with the demands of 
Buddhism itself. Translating this statement to the terms used in this paper, 
we may say, that we can find a call to transformation in important and 
leading strands of thought in the history of the community that inherited 
the mythology and message of Sakyamuni. The activity of transforming 
the self is inseparable from changing one’s style and content in communi­
cating and interacting with others; in short, it is a form of adaptation, and 
in the social dimension it is normally perceived of as adapting to circum­
stances, though the conditions that produce the change include invisible 
strata from one’s intimate thought world.
Since the believer participates in the community’s belief system, and 
since use of the word “Buddhism” presupposes a socio-historical refer­
ence—that is to say, self-criticism and transformation must occur within 
the framework of extra-personal circumstances—, adaptation is (or should 
be) the fruit of a dialogue between a person’s perception of him or her self, 
the expectations of a certain point in history and the cumulative wisdom of 
the expectations of Buddhists in other points in history. We can view this 
process of adaptation as occurring at several forms. For the sake of order, 
let us say that there are three levels:
1. Doctrinal adaptation, which has three aspects:
a. dogmatic (terminological and rhetorical)
b. scriptural or exegetical, and
c. philosophical.
2. Practical adaptation, the embodiment of belief in:
a. sacred ritual, and
b. social ritual—through monastic and lay institutions, the posi­
tion and role of lay people, women, children, etc.
3. Adaptation by experimentation—new forms, bold innovations or 
marked breaks with tradition.
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Strategies for Adaptation
Change in Doctrine and Exegesis
Doctrinal adaptation may be regarded by some as change, in the sense of 
surrender or betrayal. Others may assume that adaptation means distortion 
and confuse this philosophical presupposition with historical criticism. 
However, the believer and the historian may both profit from understand­
ing in which ways the transmission of meaning presupposes a transforma­
tion in the form of the message as the context changes. It is difficult to say 
to what extent this kind of adaptation is already taking place within estab­
lished Buddhist sects in Asia. It is even more difficult to judge how much of 
this transformation is indeed so radical that the spirit of the teaching has 
been distorted. As a matter of fact, it might be that it is impossible to de­
termine what is substantial change and what is not—as the concept of the 
“essence” or core of the teachings cannot be separated from the doctrine’s 
import. Now, the significance of a symbol or doctrine is not simply an 
object or entity to which it refers; it is more an intention, an implied 
“sense,” “drift,” or “direction,” which is a command for action in a 
particular situation. That is to say, what a given tradition means to a 
particular individual or social group is the direction in which it points the 
life of that individual or group in the specific historical context in which 
the religion is experienced and carried out. This “direction” becomes the 
“essence” of the teaching. Therefore, when the group or individual perceive 
the religion as an effective guide for action, the tradition is meaningful. 
When significance, import and purport are perceived as movement in the 
same direction as in the past, religious traditions speak of “the essence of 
the tradition”; but ultimately there is no essence beyond the sense of 
the tradition, its general direction. To regain or have meaning is thus 
tantamount to “acquiring an essence,” so that change may be the only 
way a message acquires meaning, or “gains an essence,” instead of the way 
to lose it. This view seems to me more consonant with Buddhist notions of 
impermanence and no-self-existence (jribsvabhava), which are seldom 
applied to Buddhism itself. Returning to our initial discussion regarding 
self-deception, I would like to suggest that often when we seek for an un­
changing core that we want to protect from the ravages of time, we may be 
in fact projecting our thirst for a substantial ego on the idea “I am a Bud­
dhist, Buddhism is true.”
These issues are further complicated by traditional sectarian divisions in 
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practice and interpretation. For not all Buddhist sects give the same role or 
signification to emptiness and practice. There is in Zen both a daily practi­
cal emphasis on ritual and accurate expression, and a critique of mere 
emptiness (especially as empty talk about experiencing emptiness).
Another phase of the concerted attack on self that is facilitated by the 
historical situation in which we live is the skillful use of scriptural and ex- 
egetical tools. The concept of dialogue with tradition suggests to me the 
need for more exact and analytical approaches to the study of Buddhist 
scriptural traditions. We should seek less confirmation and more new in­
sights. In terms of scholarship this means greater emphasis on the critical 
study of texts, and on new approaches to interpretation. It is obvious that a 
reevaluation of existing techniques for scriptural and exegetical study is 
necessary if Buddhism is to become intellectually acceptable in the West. 
But the direction in which Buddhist exegesis and hermeneutics will or 
should move is not clear.
Perhaps the greatest exegetical problems are in the scholar’s attitude 
towards the text. We are still too literal minded, we have very little sense 
for metaphor and mythology. Among Buddhists in the East as well as in 
the West, understanding of the mechanics of philological criticism seems to 
have jumped well ahead of the capacity to search for meaning in the text. 
There is still a dearth of scholarly translations, only a couple of modern 
commentaries, and the conventions of translating literary formulae and 
imagery, and technical terminology can only be described accurately as 
Babel. Hermeneutical methods are still crude, and knowledge of the sources 
imperfect. It is therefore easy to bring to bear sectarian preferences long 
before the tradition is given an opportunity to express itself.
Traditional interpretations offer both problems and solutions, but very 
little has been done to attain a modern, and conscious, understanding of 
classical Buddhist hermeneutics. It remains to be seen whether modern 
students of scripture can adopt much from classical Indian or Chinese 
approaches to exegesis. One should also explore other, less obvious tech­
niques of scriptural interpretation. The Zen tradition, for instance, may 
offer, mutatis mutandis, a model for a form of demythologization that is 
not reductionistic.
Traditional Zen attitudes toward doctrine and tradition perhaps throw 
some light on this point. The constant reformulation of doctrine in “dharma 
combat” is in Zen a critical method—a method with subtle historical and 
psychological insights. This way of adapting doctrine presupposes a tacit 
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understanding that the most important feature of meaning is the applica­
tion of the teachings to one’s own personal circumstances. Traditional Zen 
teaching styles suggest that one cannot grasp the sense of the teaching, and 
that no true transmission can occur apart from one’s own appropriation of 
the teachings—a point illustrated by Gutei’s rejection of his disciple’s imita­
tion, or by Lin-chi’s parting words. This appropriation and this applica­
tion are shaped by a critique of oneself and a critique of the traditions. 
Accordingly, it is not enough to want to follow the Buddha’s path. One 
must kill oneself. And it is not enough to kill oneself, one must kill the 
Buddha, and kill the Patriarchs of the Zen tradition.
The issue for Buddhism, especially Zen, is whether one can apply these 
fundamentally religious, but still critical ideals to historical and social 
transformation. On the surface at least, historical awareness and Zen 
seem to be convergent methodologies. In terms of the sociology of knowl­
edge, there are strands of Zen which parallel Western concepts of pro­
gressive revelation and kairology.
There are, of course, Indian roots to this Zen attitude. Its foundation are 
the Buddhist concepts of the two truths (with a special emphasis on the 
notion of samvrti as upaya), and the doctrine of the decline of Dharma 
(understood in a manner somewhat different from the mappo-shiso version). 
But these are topics for a more extensive discussion.
Progress in this area will require a great scholarly effort, an effort which 
probably will result in a new kind of Buddhist believer and practitioner, 
and a new type of Buddhist scholar. Buddhists will have to reassess the im­
portance of Indian materials, while attempting a more eclectic approach to 
non-Indian traditions. Those who pride themselves on being only “practic­
ing Buddhists” must learn to appreciate the importance of scientific textual 
work and critical self-awareness. The policy of open doctrinal discussion 
and questioning must extend, of course, to communication with other Bud­
dhists. The time when it will be too late to attempt ecumenical cooperation 
in Buddhist scholarship is rapidly approaching.
Philosophical Adaptation
At this point it may be worthwhile to discuss some misunderstandings that 
may arise with regard to the notion of a religion without an unchanging 
doctrine. It is common, for instance, to assume that the notion of “dynamic 
essence” or absence of an essence is synonymous with antinomianism, 
relativism, or some extreme form of the “perennial philosophy,” which 
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would assume that all doctrines are true. Another common extension is the 
idea that Buddhist doctrine is not open to criticism, since Buddhism has 
no fixed doctrine. Nagarjuna himself is to blame for this dangerous asser­
tion, since he says as much in his Vigrahavyavartani and Ratnavali. How­
ever, he is to be exonerated from any guilt by association with some of the 
extreme forms that his statement takes in the lips of his interpreters. The 
simplistic escapism is derived from his writings only through an erroneous 
interpretation. The assumption is that we—the Buddhists—do not affirm 
anything, and therefore there is nothing in our doctrine to be criticized. This 
is an incomplete statement of the notion of emptiness. For, if the assump­
tion is that the doctrine of emptiness is a type of coincidentia oppositorum, 
and this is understood literally to mean that all opposites actually coincide, 
and all statements are equally valid, then we have only restated one of the 
catuskoti and the Naiyayika position is true. If, on the other hand, it is 
assumed that doctrine’s purport is that all entities are equally unreal and 
all statements equally false, again this is understood literally to mean that 
all things are actually the same, and this reverts as well to the antinomies.
Perhaps we should attempt a different explanation of the context of 
Nagarjuna’s statement. The context is the use of emptiness itself as a 
critique of other views. Emptiness is not a position in the sense that it does 
not belong to the class of statements made with the purpose of establishing 
an unmoving essence as a refuge for the mind. The moment we change it 
into such, it is no longer emptiness, and we become thereby open to criti­
cism. Nagarjuna’s intent is more in the way of (a) putting an end to all 
views as philosophical via purgativa, and (b) transcending the symbol to 
attain true unity with the reality of emptiness. But, by definition, this unity 
is by way of no-thing; that is, emptiness is not a thing, therefore, not a 
refuge, not a certain truth, nor a certainty about truth. It is not meant 
either as an all-encompassing reality that will erase differences and remove 
difficulties. Translating this to the language of this paper: if Buddhism 
offers a refuge and a confirmation for ourselves, the whole enterprise is 
open to suspicion and criticism. If Buddhism solves social and historical 
difficulties by erasing distinctions, it is only a subtle confirmation of the 
ego.
Philosophical adaptation, as well as doctrinal adaptation, is of vital 
importance in contemporary Buddhism. Philosophical discourse is still an 
important route to intellectual import and respectability. In the West it has 
been the most important road to theological and intellectual integrity since 
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the Middle Ages. Established sects must all give a cogent theological ac­
count based on the most contemporary philosophical critique. But not 
surprisingly, the requirement is for contemporary explicability. In this, 
most exercises in religious philosophy have come short. By appealing 
superficially to philosophical forms that hold little or no attraction for 
modern Western intelligentsia, Buddhism displays, to the Western analyst 
at least, a certain lack of vitality.
We all prefer, of course, to look for earlier parallels—there is something 
in the form of Buddhist philosophical argument that brings it close to me­
dieval or—perhaps—to nineteenth century philosophy. It is also easy to 
seek the more mystical, speculative or intuitive forms of Western philoso­
phy as parallels. Apart from the problem of spurious or meaningless 
parallels (similarities that are only superficial), one should also seek to es­
tablish precise analogies, that is, parallels that will open Buddhism to criti­
cal philosophy. Presumably, by the ensuing critique, a healthy and vigorous 
speculative philosophy will develop. One example that has been discussed 
extensively is the parallel with Wittgenstein. I have my reservations with 
this model, but it is an example of a fertile parallel.
The latter approach is necessary to bring Buddhist philosophical dis­
course closer to more contemporary currents of critical philosophy. It is far 
more crucial, however, to find alternative categories and methods within 
the tradition than it is to establish parallels that will enlighten us on the 
critical nature of Buddhist thought. There has been an excessive reliance 
on the more obvious aspects of Buddhist philosophy (emptiness, non­
duality, etc.). Other categories that could bring Buddhist philosophy into 
the camp of Western debates should be used: causation, language (prajnapti 
and apoha), logical ciriticism, etc. Other aspects of Buddhist philosophic 
discourse have less explicit potential, but may bear fruit after some sys­
tematic reworking or development; for there are areas in which Buddhist 
doctrine has implicit analytical approaches only waiting to be discovered 
and expanded in a contemporary setting—such is the field of moral 
philosophy. In this connection a revival in our study of Indian Buddhism is 
an important desideratum.
Zen itself is, in its own way, a form of critical thought. That is, it sets 
itself against an accepted doctrine, which is rejected in order to establish a 
higher synthesis, or a critical understanding of the doctrine thus criticized. 
The critique of language is one of the most important elements in this 
tradition, and suggests a link with contemporary notions of linguistic 
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analysis, deconstruction, etc.
As a part of interpretation, philosophical discourse in Buddhism needs 
to be more consciously grounded in the study of Buddhist philosophical 
tradition and the critical study of the sutra literature. In this approach there 
is no doubt in my mind that the Indian philosophical tradition should 
play a more important role than it has played so far in contemporary 
Buddhist hermeneutics. And I refer here not to our favorite vague refer­
ences to Madhyamika non-duality, and the nita-neya distinction, but to the 
study of Buddhist theories of epistemology, logic, metaphysics, and 
hermeneutics.
Practical Adaptation
In the area of spiritual exercise and institutional reform we are faced with 
another complex set of problems, dominated by the tension between the 
monastic specialist and the lay adherent. The “secular age” has changed 
radically the balance in this polarity. From the point of view of Buddhist 
doctrine the issue is not only the social and political force of the laity in the 
modern world. Changing social conditions may reveal important, and 
previously neglected aspects of Buddhist doctrine—the laity as embodi­
ment of the bodhisattva, and a deeper understanding of the import of the 
identity of samsara and nirvana. The crucial question should be how to 
achieve a balance between laity and monkhood (or priesthood, as the case 
may be). In other words, as laymen we must let monasticism serve its role 
as a symbol of the loneliness of the path, as a critique of attachment; but 
monks must open themselves to the value of the lay ideal as a critique of 
withdrawal from the world, as a symbol that reestablishes the balance 
between emptiness and form.
Be that as it may, social involvement and social work should be con­
sidered in terms of another doctrine that, in spite of its centrality in 
Mahayana Buddhism, has not been exploited to its maximum potential. 
This is the doctrine of upaya, understood as the relevance of the use of 
effective strategies in assisting living beings. In other words, I understand 
the doctrine of upaya as a statement on the nature of emptiness as active 
emptiness, as the practical application of the empty mind to the solution of 
particular human situations.
With the issues of laicization and “means,” the philosophical problem 
of ethical reflection must take a new turn. Moral choice as it arises in 
modern pluralistic societies or in societies with severe problems of social 
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justice, uncovers problems that Buddhists have faced before in extremely 
different contexts. Following the adoption of Western concepts of freedom, 
social justice and social action—whether in the capitalist or the socialist 
model—Buddhist cultures have entered the most serious ideological and 
social crisis in their history. In this area I tend to assume a conservative 
stance; that is, I am suspicious of attempts to make of Buddhism an 
“active” religion on the Christian model. A full discussion of these issues 
must be left for another occasion, as it would require more space than I 
have available here. One must, however, point to several key practical 
implications.
We are used to arguing that Buddhism has the complete and perfect 
version of the spiritual path—we never bother to ask which style of Bud­
dhist practice we are talking about. May I risk rushing where angels dare 
not tread by suggesting that a more careful consideration of the doctrine of 
upaya may enrich Buddhist notions of practice by instilling new life into a 
neglected aspect of Mahayana doctrine? I am referring to the notion of 
upaya understood as ethical and social strategies. Conceived as specific 
practical methodologies for the alleviation of human suffering, upayas can 
contribute to the proper application of the full force of Buddhism as a 
critique of self-centeredness. Areas such as psychotherapy, social work, 
family counseling, relations between the sexes and the races, are all aspects 
that require practical strategies, which lie dormant in Buddhism awaiting 
to be made explicit and active.
Further implications of the development of social awareness in Bud­
dhism would have to be attested empirically, but one may expect important 
changes in all aspects of the Buddhist perception of society. Naturally, 
change in time is not the only challenge; even without the rapid transmuta­
tions of the present, in any given moment in history each and every one of 
a variety of social orders can be regarded as “the Buddhist order.” Change 
has been occurring in both dimensions, as diachronic and synchronic varia­
tion. But it seems that in more recent times Buddhist institutions have been 
too slow to react in more than one phase of adaptation. For instance, only 
recently have Buddhists begun to address the question of the traditional 
position of women. The Madhyamika view on sex differences is often 
presented as an antidote to sexual bias. Among Zen practitioners, too, sex 
differences are brushed aside with a theoretical or rhetoric appeal to empti­
ness. The history of Buddhism, however, indicates that these problems 
require the skillful application of specific plans of action. In other words, 
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whatever one’s interpretation of emptiness, problems of social ethics are 
problems of practical reason and methods to be applied to specific human 
situations. An appeal to religious transcendence, whether philosophical 
(the “non-dual”) or social (the monastic model), is essential to the Bud­
dhist approach as a critique of the conceptual constructs that generate 
various forms of suffering. But this critique fails to meet the immediate 
needs of those who are faced with an ethical choice or judgement, and who 
rightly expect from Buddhism a solution, or at least a guiding doctrinal 
position.
Experimentation: Words of Caution. I do want to offer, however, the fol­
lowing warning. At this stage of adaptation, especially in the West, dedica­
tion to conventional forms of practice—that is, training under established 
masters, and in traditional settings—is far more important than any con­
scious or studied attempts to create new forms. At least in America, the 
danger of discontinuity is greater than the danger of irrelevance. Traditional 
patterns of practice and doctrine should not be replaced uncritically by a 
new commitment to open secularization. Intense spiritual exercise means 
also less speculation on the essence of Zen, and more familiarity with its 
past; not less adaptation, but more research into the past, and gradual 
transformation arising from this understanding is needed. The only urgent 
change is in the direction of greater discipline and discerning analysis.
The problem is avoiding the unrestrained and unsystematic, individual 
meditation and speculation that often goes for Buddhism in the West, 
while allowing for new creative forces. Evidently, it is no easy enterprise to 
create an environment of respect for tradition while maintaining the mo­
mentum for reform and growth. I have no facile answers, but if Buddhism 
is to be something more than a superimposed exotic order, it will have to 
seek for such a balance. Some hierarchies will have to be abandoned, 
others will have to adapt to new formats. Alternative expressions or 
formulations of authority will have to appear in an environment of tolera­
tion towards diverging forms.
Conclusions
We are used to thinking that the believer or practitioner has no alternative 
but to distinguish between the nature (or “essence,” if you will) of his reli­
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gion and the particular forms that it takes—whatever might be the specific 
explanation you choose to explain the interface between the two. There are, 
however, some alternatives to this quandary. In this paper the model of a 
dialogue with tradition has been suggested as an alternative. According to 
this model, one does not have to seek or find a single voice in tradition. The 
nature of, for instance, Zen would therefore take more than one form, and 
clinging to any particular form could be a shortsighted way of betraying the 
elasticity of its “nature.” One tends to think that meaningfulness requires a 
fulcrum or unchanging pith, that otherwise one must give up his quest for 
meaning. But the “nature” of a religious system and practice is not neces­
sarily an unchanging essence; rather, the historical reality of religion, like 
other human phenomena, suggests a much more complex model. Perhaps 
one can speak of recurring themes, a dynamic tone or an intertwining of 
strands. Although it does not make much sense to speak of mainline or 
essential Buddhism, one can distinguish different strands or dominant ideas 
and practices that repeatedly constitute the ideal, or the characteristic, or 
the common, etc.
Could it be that one should imagine future forms of Zen in which some or 
much of what we know today as Zen were missing? At which point then, 
does Zen stop being Zen? Or to express it otherwise, what is it in Zen that 
we want to preserve? What is it that we may, in fact, want to discard—not 
just because historical circumstances force us to discard it, but because it is 
now perceived as a contradiction, an inconsistency within the tradition, or 
an unnecessary trapping from the past. This paper has discussed these 
issues cursorily combining two perspectives: that of a historian, and that of 
a believer. From the former point of view one speaks only of the direction 
in which events move. From the second point of view, one lists requirements 
and desiderata.
No purpose is served by hiding behind the metaphysical loftiness of 
emptiness. Whatever our view on the ultimate meaninglessness of success, 
Buddhism as a historical reality faces almost insurmountable odds, that the 
possibility of success for Buddhism in the West is limited, and that its de­
cline in Asia seems inevitable. The courage to accept these facts—or what­
ever other facts history may have for us—should not substitute our concern 
for the survival of the tradition.
Leaving aside the significance of mappo doctrines as doctrines of inter­
pretation, I would like to suggest that, mappo or no mappo, there is much 
that Buddhists can do. For one, we should search for alternative strategies
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and develop new attitudes. The first attitude that must be changed is the 
assumption that emptiness has to do with passivity and resignation. There 
is such a thing as active emptiness—or what the Ratnacuda calls “empti­
ness adorned by all the virtues.”
In conclusion I would like to return to my original three questions. The 
lofty question “What is it that Buddhism has to offer mankind?” I have 
transformed into “What is Buddhism?” (or rather, “What do I mean by 
‘Buddhism’?”) and “What do I expect from Buddhism?” These questions 
I have further refined by looking into myself and my true intentions, and 
forcing myself to accept the rephrasing, “Who are Buddhists ?” and “What 
do I expect from identifying myself with what they say and do ?” With this 
change I expect to have gained in sincerity and clarity what I have lost in 
loftiness.
To the first question I have answered: Buddhists are all those who claim 
to follow any strand in the complex fabric of traditions that are traced 
back—genetically, so to speak—to Sakyamuni Buddha. This fabric may or 
may not form a coherent system—historically speaking it probably does 
not, but it does not matter, since I am not looking for a system. The 
fundamental assumption is that in their various expressions these human 
beings have found different layers of meaning in the doctrine and mythol­
ogy of Sakyamuni Buddha and the history of the Saipgha. I am assuming 
that we can find similar inspiration.
Therefore, I am not interested in consciously or purposefully pursuing a 
path of interpretations that will lead to a system of philosophy in a 
Western sense. Nor am I concerned immediately with the social or political 
success of any particular group of Buddhists. But, ultimately, much is at 
stake for me in this success, for I cannot deny my interest in seeing those 
ideals prosper and grow. For these reasons, I am indeed interested in 
seeing a more positive approach to adaptation.
The strategies for adaptation that can be used in pursuing this goal are 
many, and they can be applied in a variety of permutations. This paper 
does not claim to be anything more than a partial listing of some of these 
alternatives, a brainstorm for a program. Among the options open to us, 
the following figure prominently. The nature of the tradition, and the 
notion of a (never-ending) dialogue with its complex past require some 
form of hermeneutical and scholarly pluralism (or ecumenism). There is 
still room for a greater emphasis on the dissemination of the teaching, 
which one should try to achieve without the aggressive proselytizing tech-
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niques usually associated with missions, and with a greater promotion of 
contemporary interpretations and methods. The latter will require, of 
course, a shift in emphasis in some traditional Buddhist approaches to 
doctrine and practice, in Buddhist views of scholarship, philosophy, his­
tory, individual responsibility, and social action. Buddhism can make the 
change without any major transformation in its mythology and rhetoric. 
But it may be, I am afraid, more difficult to be successful in implementing 
the changes in time to make Buddhism socially adaptable.
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